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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past three years, the world of banking has seen a resurgence 
of Western political, regulatory, and scholarly interest in competition 
policy in general and competition law in particular. Antitrust is back in 
the spotlight. This resurgence of interest comes after a considerable hia-
tus. To be sure, concerns about levels of competitiveness and potential 
oligopoly have surfaced regularly in recent decades: there has been a 
persistent flow of both antitrust banking cases and academic studies of 
the theory and practice of such legal interventions. However, the antitrust 
spotlight has not been so firmly trained on the banking sector for a long 
time, arguably since the 1950s. Richard Sylla, among others, has ob-
served that the 1930s to 1950s were notable for an “anti-concentration 
attitude” toward banking, especially in the United States.1 Only with the 
departure of “Harry Truman and his trust-busting administration” did the 
antitrust spotlight begin to dim.2 
How can we account for the refocusing of this spotlight? Two con-
nected sets of factors seem to be critical. First, there is a widespread per-
ception among politicians, regulators, and the general public—indeed, 
among almost everyone except certain sections of the banking communi-
ty—that today’s largest banks have become “too big to fail” (TBTF). 
Might, then, antitrust have a role in cutting such banks down to a size 
where the systemic risks deemed to be associated with being TBTF can 
be meaningfully diminished? Second, there are concerns regarding what 
has happened to banking competition both during the recent global fi-
nancial crisis and indeed in the period leading up to it. With allegedly 
TBTF banks tottering precariously, antitrust scrutiny was relaxed and 
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emergency consolidation encouraged in a number of different territories 
at the height of the crisis. With the benefit of hindsight, how might this 
consolidation be conceptualized and potentially revisited? And is there a 
case to be made that antitrust was not doing its job properly in the years 
and decades preceding the crisis? How could banks have become TBTF 
in the first place if antitrust was working effectively? 
Situated in this context, this Article has two main aims: to provide a 
critical consideration of this contemporary antitrust “revival” from an 
explicitly political–economic perspective and to point toward some theo-
retical resources that might facilitate such an assessment. 
Part II looks backward at the evolution and application of competi-
tion law in the banking sector over the relatively longue durée. In this 
Part, I invoke the concept of “exception” to understand how antitrust 
policy has developed, and my chief interlocutors are the perhaps unlikely 
figures of Giorgio Agamben and Karl Marx. Part III looks forward and 
considers the central question around which the recent resurgence of 
interest in antitrust ultimately revolves: can (and should) antitrust law 
help in tackling the TBTF problem? The tentative conclusion is that un-
less we are prepared to fundamentally rethink the purpose of competition 
law—and in relation to this, the nature of capitalist competition itself—
then the answer must be no. This is not because (as some commentators 
have argued) TBTF is not an antitrust issue. Rather, it is because antitrust 
theory and practice are today thoroughly economized, whereas the com-
petition between large banks appears to be largely non-economic. In 
making this argument, I appeal not to Agamben and Marx, but to Paul 
Baran and Paul Sweezy, and most directly of all to the theorist whose 
name this symposium bears, Adolf Berle. 
II. BANKING, ANTITRUST, AND STATES OF EXCEPTION 
The years 2008 and 2009 saw several extremely high-profile emer-
gency bank mergers in some of the world’s most important banking mar-
kets. This included Lloyds TSB with HBOS in the UK and at least three 
major mergers in the United States: Bank of America with Merrill 
Lynch, J.P. Morgan with Bear Stearns, and Wells Fargo with Wachovia. 
These mergers would have been expected to face close antitrust scrutiny 
under “normal” conditions. In the event, none did, with conditions being 
relaxed and special clauses—for example, a “national interest” clause in 
the Lloyds HBOS case—being invoked.3 
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A. States of Exception 
One way to theorize these emergency measures in political–
economic terms would be to follow the lead of the urban political-
economist Phillip Ashton. In a recent paper, Ashton draws on 
Agamben’s notion of the “state of exception” to argue that emergency 
state interventions during financial crises have become productive mo-
ments for credit risk, securing broader norms of risk-taking by selecting 
out and effectively socializing problematic loans.4 In other words, the 
state utilizes the emergency situation to take exceptional measures to 
reinforce, rather than reconfigure, the existing logics of capitalist finance. 
Accordingly, can we approach the recent crisis as a comparable moment 
of “exception” for antitrust: one during which abnormal practices were 
taken or enabled in order to further entrench existing political–economic 
structures and processes? 
Since not much seems to have changed in the world of finance and 
its governance, maybe we can. However, I would argue that to apply 
Ashton’s framework to banking and competition policy would be to mis-
read both the crux of Agamben’s thesis and the late-twentieth-century 
history of antitrust enforcement. The originality of Agamben’s thesis is 
in his assertion that over the course of the twentieth century, the state of 
exception became anything but exceptional. It became normal: the relax-
ation or suspension of “normal” legal relations became nothing less than 
the paradigm of modern government.5 This, on my reading, would actu-
ally represent a far more accurate conceptualization of competition poli-
cy in the banking sector during the two or three decades preceding the 
financial crisis. This period appears, in retrospect, as an extended state of 
exception from the putative long arm of antitrust law. Consolidation pro-
ceeded apace in all the major Western banking markets as regulators and 
competition authorities waved through one major merger after another.6 
The mergers of the crisis period represented a continuation of, rather than 
exceptional departure from, this trend. 
This begs an obvious question: How can we understand such an ex-
tended state of exception in regard to competition law and banking? 
Three possible explanations can be identified. The first two concern the 
methodology of late-twentieth-century antitrust law, one in a generic and 
international context and one relating specifically to banking, and specif-
ically in the United States. The generic methodological factor can best be 
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conceived in terms of the neoclassicization of antitrust. As the principles 
and practices of competition law came to be dominated by neoclassical 
economic approaches from the late 1970s, monopoly—or oligopoly—
lost some of its historical illegitimacy. Increasingly, the singular objec-
tive of antitrust law was defined as the promotion of economic welfare 
through a focus on allocative efficiency. Crucially, under such an ap-
proach, monopoly becomes admissible since it is only presumptively 
inefficient: monopoly can be more efficient than competition where the 
economies of centralizing production outweigh the costs of monopoly 
pricing. Thus, as efficiency considerations were layered over traditional 
market share and market concentration measures, mergers that threatened 
potential monopoly could be more comfortably authorized. “After 
Ronald Reagan took office in 1981,” claims Barry Lynn, “his new head 
of antitrust enforcement, William F. Baxter, swiftly abandoned efforts to 
promote competition and promised instead a policy ‘based on efficiency 
considerations.’”7 
Alongside this wider neoclassical reformulation of antitrust, Ameri-
can antitrust authorities made decisions concerning the treatment of 
commercial banking that I, as a geographer, find particularly salient. All 
antitrust investigations require both geographic and product market defi-
nitions. To assess whether an existing or merged corporate entity might 
enjoy market power, the market in question—its product or service form 
and its geographical extent—must first be delimited. U.S. commercial 
banks, it was decided, competed with one another locally.8 This was a 
crucially important geographical determination in terms of its implica-
tions for antitrust investigations of the bank sector. A problematic merger 
proposal was one that threatened high levels of concentration at the local 
scale—not at the national scale—because commercial banks ostensibly 
did not compete nationally. The result was that numerous relatively small 
bank mergers were blocked on the grounds that local competition might 
be curtailed. Meanwhile, the authorities approved much larger mergers 
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that materially increased national levels of market concentration, but 
which were perceived as harmless at the all-important local level.9 
But the extended state of exception, which I suggest characterized 
banking under competition law in the decades leading up to the financial 
crisis, was perhaps not only a matter of methodological reformulation 
and refinement. It must also be placed within a much longer history of 
widely varying approaches to competition policy in the finance sector.10 
Competition has, at certain junctures, been minimally enforced; at other 
times, it has been actively discouraged.11 The reason for this is that regu-
lation of the financial sector within capitalism has always been regarded 
as a delicate balancing act—ideally fostering competition, but never at 
the expense of that other shibboleth of banking propriety: financial sta-
bility.12 When stability has been seen as paramount (and not only during 
times of perceived crisis), competition has been actively dampened. And 
while some historians might argue that the period from the 1970s 
through 2007 was one in which the balance of regulatory priorities was 
in favor of competition, stability concerns have never been entirely ab-
sent. Indeed, the influential British economic commentator John Kay 
recently claimed in the Financial Times that “throughout the 20th centu-
ry, we maintained stability in British banking through oligopoly, with 
minimal competition, no new entry and no banking failure of any signifi-
cance.”13 Thus, by broadening our historical perspective, we may be 
justified in seeing the strongly competition-oriented 1940s and 1950s as 
the exception to a wider rule of stability prioritization. From this vantage 
point, the disapplication of antitrust during the recent crisis looks entirely 
unexceptional; thus, our theorization should not be of an exceptional 
period, but of an exceptional (because it is stability-requiring) banking 
sector. 
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B. The Investment Banking Exception 
In recent decades, of all areas of the banking industry, an enduring 
state of exception from antitrust has been most notable in investment 
banking, and additional explanations for banking’s exceptionality are 
required here. In other words, efficiency and stability considerations are 
not in themselves adequate. This section briefly highlights two explana-
tions specific to investment banking. The first is a matter of historical 
failure. In United States v. Henry S. Morgan, the U.S. government fa-
mously challenged the major Wall Street investment banks from 1947 
through 1953 in a long, costly, high-stakes antitrust case alleging endem-
ic cartel-like behavior—and lost.14 Chastened by this failure, it is perhaps 
no wonder that competition authorities in the United States and else-
where subsequently backed off from the investment banking sector and 
left it largely to its own devices, focusing their interventionist energies 
elsewhere. 
The second and more pertinent explanation (which chimes with an 
issue we will consider more closely below) concerns the nature and loca-
tion of capitalist competition dynamics and how we can conceptualize 
these. Generally, the main focus of post-war antitrust law has always 
been consumer-facing business activities on the grounds that consumer 
economic welfare is and should be such a law’s primary consideration. 
Where businesses serve other businesses, especially large businesses, 
competition law has been much less vigorously applied. The experience 
of the banking sector is typical: substantial antitrust scrutiny into retail 
and small-business commercial banking, but relatively little into invest-
ment banking. While the “man on the street” requires protection from 
unscrupulous monopolistic or oligopolistic commercial banks, the big 
companies that represent investment banks’ main customer base do not. 
The problem with this dualistic approach is the questionable, linked 
assumptions it contains. The first of these is that, in the words of the 
British antitrust lawyer Becket McGrath, investment banking customers 
are generally “big enough to look after themselves.”15 They can either 
resist monopoly pricing or absorb its costs. But the presumption of cost 
absorption is itself predicated on an atomistic and not remotely credible 
conception of the economy: it assumes that if investment banks charge 
their clients monopoly prices, those customers absorb this monopolistic 
rent in full; they do not pass any of it on to their own customers. To disa-
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buse ourselves of this particular misconception, we can usefully turn to 
Marx. In one of the concluding chapters of the final volume of Capital, 
felicitously titled “The Illusion Created by Competition,” Marx scorns 
the notion that monopolies somehow transform the law of value. Accu-
mulation and pricing dynamics, he notes, do not play out independently 
within what we like to think of as discrete industry “sectors”; rather, 
A monopoly price for certain commodities simply transfers a por-
tion of the profit made by the other commodity producers to the 
commodities with the monopoly price [here, the investment banking 
service]. Indirectly, there is a local disturbance in the distribution of 
surplus-value among the various spheres of production, but this 
leaves unaffected the limit of the surplus-value itself.16 
In other words, the notion that only investment banks’ immediate clients 
would be affected by monopoly pricing is based on a fallacy of separate 
industry sector economics. In reality, Marx concludes, the monopoly 
price is paid from two sources: “from the profit of other capitalists,” and 
“by deduction from real wages.”17 Where investment banking is con-
cerned, antitrust has implicitly internalized such transfers. 
III. ANTITRUST, TOO BIG TO FAIL, AND THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST 
COMPETITION 
With this context in mind, how then should we theorize and assess 
the recent resurgence of interest in antitrust in the banking context? As I 
indicated at the outset, this resurgence is closely bound up with the prob-
lem of TBTF: the sense not only that antitrust might help alleviate this 
problem, but also that a more rigorous application of antitrust in recent 
decades could perhaps have prevented the problem from arising. The 
rekindling of antitrust energies is currently apparent in multiple markets, 
including the United States and Europe. Indeed, within two months in 
mid-2012, two major antitrust-related banking investigations—albeit 
investigations not directly concerned with the TBTF phenomenon—
yielded high-profile results. First, in May 2012, in United States v. 
Carollo, Goldberg & Grimm, three ex-bankers were found guilty by a 
U.S. federal jury of manipulating auctions for municipal-bond invest-
ment contracts.18 Five major Wall Street banks, furthermore, have paid 
over $700 million to settle claims associated with the same U.S. probe 
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into the collusive rigging of bids for investing the proceeds of the sales 
of such bonds.19 
Second, in June 2012, in a settlement with three separate authorities 
(the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority and, in the United 
States, the Department of Justice and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission), the U.K.-headquartered bank Barclays was fined more 
than $450 million for attempting to manipulate the pivotal London Inter-
bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) for interest.20 Once again, this individual 
settlement occurred within the context of a much wider, ongoing investi-
gation into alleged antitrust violations and immediately prompted calls 
for conclusive answers. Philip Augur wrote in the Financial Times: 
We need to know whether several banks were in this together in a 
formal or informal ring. If so, such an organised rigging of the mar-
ket would revive suspicions about the existence of a banking cartel. 
If one market was rigged, might there not be others? Regulators 
must look again at places where there has been a lack of price com-
petition, for example on new issues and other capital markets busi-
ness where price protection appears to have been occurring.21 
More broadly, influential economic commentators had already issued a 
series of high-profile antitrust rallying cries. For example, in early 2010, 
a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Simon Johnson, 
identified antitrust scrutiny, explicitly of TBTF financial institutions, as 
“a sensible idea that is long overdue.”22 
A. Differing Views on Antitrust and TBTF Banks 
Not surprisingly, some legal scholars and political and regulatory 
authorities have been quick to offer opinions on what we can generally 
expect of antitrust, specifically vis-à-vis TBTF banks in the post-crisis 
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era. Some, mostly from the strict neoclassical tradition, say we cannot 
and indeed should not expect much because to make TBTF an antitrust 
issue is to misunderstand both. Antitrust, they say, is about competition, 
while TBTF is about size, and size per se is not a competition issue. 
“TBTF,” avers Lawrence White, “does not represent an instance in 
which size involves the exercise of market power.”23 
Others are slightly more optimistic. They say that antitrust should 
have a role in the fostering of a financial system in which banks are not 
TBTF. However, their argument comes with a significant caveat. Anti-
trust as it is currently configured—specifically, antitrust with the meth-
odological dispositions described in the first part of this Article (in other 
words, with strong efficiency considerations, and with a privileging of 
the local geographical scale)—is simply not properly equipped to inhibit 
big national or even international bank mergers. Important voices have 
recently made this case, including Albert Foer, the President of the 
American Antitrust Institute.24 For such commentators, antitrust needs 
methodological revision to be effective. 
Finally, there are those who think not only that TBTF is an antitrust 
issue, but also that if scrupulously applied, contemporary antitrust will be 
able to do the policing work that it has seemingly failed to do in the past. 
Legal scholar Sharon Foster, for instance, points to the powerful possibil-
ities of systemic risk analysis. Foster maintains that such analysis “will 
work under current law without the need for legislative amendment nor a 
reconsideration of the law by courts.” Thus, “the antidote to too big to 
fail is antitrust.”25 
With the possible exception of White’s (whose argument I perceive 
to be tendentious), all such positions are to one extent or another defen-
sible. Yet critically, they share a certain conservativeness in the scope of 
their conceptualization of the issues at hand. Specifically, none venture 
beyond relatively narrow framings either of antitrust—what it is, what it 
could and should be—or, perhaps more importantly, of the nature of 
corporate competition in the banking sector. In the remainder of this 
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Article, I propose a more radical theorization of the pertinent issues, ex-
plicitly from a political–economy perspective. 
B. Baran, Sweezy, and Berle’s Political Economy 
To discuss a more radical theorization of the role of antitrust, we re-
turn to two important political–economic interventions from the mid-
century. One is Baran and Sweezy’s influential Monopoly Capital, pub-
lished in 1966. A central tenet of this book is that contrary both to popu-
lar beliefs and to the conventions of neoclassical economics, capitalist 
firms do not necessarily engage in “real,” price-based competition. In-
stead, big corporations can be seen to behave toward each other in what 
Joseph Schumpeter had called a “corespective” manner, maintaining the 
impression of serious competition but in reality refraining from eroding 
each other’s profits.26 Explicit price-fixing would be the most egregious 
example of such behavior. Baran and Sweezy suggested that this type of 
behavior had in fact become the norm within modern capitalism—and 
competition, “perfect” or otherwise, a state of exception.27 An “attitude 
of live-and-let-live toward other members of the corporate world,” ac-
cording to Baran and Sweezy, now dominated capitalist microeconomic 
affairs.28 
Yet for all its impact, this argument was not wholly novel. Twelve 
years earlier, Adolf Berle published The 20th Century Capitalist Revolu-
tion, a book vastly less influential than his work, The Modern Corpora-
tion, and criticized from all sides for its policy recommendations, but 
nonetheless brimming with insights regarding the core dynamics of the 
corporate world.29 Berle’s starting point was with the high levels of con-
centration visible in key sectors of the American economy, including 
banking. In such a situation, he observed, competition looks very differ-
ent from “when thousands of tradesmen, craftsmen, or farmers are offer-
ing their wares to thousands of customers.” In place of intense price 
competition one finds “either consolidation, or elimination of one of the 
units, or”—and here again the echoes of Schumpeter are unmistakea-
ble—“acceptance of a situation in which the place of each is approxi-
mately respected.” In short, competition is “rarely if ever permitted to 
carry through to its logical result. Nobody, it seems, wants that.”30 
                                                            
 26. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 90 n.5 (1942). 
 27. This exception might be considered a complement to the historical regulatory “exception” 
of meaningful, competition-oriented antitrust in banking. 
 28. PAUL BARAN & PAUL SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL: AN ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER 48 (1966). 
 29. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954). 
 30. Id. at 45–46, 48. 
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This, of course, was very similar to Baran and Sweezy’s later ar-
gument. What distinguishes Berle’s thesis, however, is his further devel-
opment of this observation regarding the lack of price competition. 
“[C]ompetition in mid-twentieth century,” he concluded, “leads more 
often to a political than to an economic resolution of events.”31 At a cer-
tain point, in concentrated industries, economics is set aside and politics 
takes over. Berle was so sure of this dynamic that he called it “indefensi-
bly disingenuous to assert that these operations are primarily following 
economic laws more or less accurately outlined by the classic economists 
a century ago when the fact appears to be that they are following a slow-
ly emerging pattern of sociological and political laws.”32 
Interestingly, Berle was something of an expert on antitrust and 
competition in banking, and in 1949, he penned a paper in the Columbia 
Law Review that anticipated the arguments of The 20th Century Capital-
ist Revolution, specifically in relation to banking.33 If large corporations 
generically did not obey economic laws, then this was especially true, he 
believed, in finance. If banking was unique, then for Berle its uniqueness 
lay in the fact that a political rather than economic response to competi-
tion was, to a degree, necessary: “While competition may be desirable up 
to a point in deposit banking, there is a clear bottom limit to its desirabil-
ity.” He continued: “a high degree of cooperation among banks is essen-
tial.”34 
As I will suggest shortly, Berle’s theory of the sociopolitical laws 
of corporate behavior is tremendously insightful and consequential in the 
antitrust context. But was—and is—he right? Do large corporations, and 
banks in particular, circumvent the “laws” of price competition? In one 
sense the question is rhetorical, because a central purpose of antitrust 
practice is precisely to try to answer it. But there are certainly those who 
have little doubt (and the recent revelations from the United States v. 
Carollo and Barclays LIBOR cases will hardly have shaken their convic-
tions). John Kay, whom I referenced earlier, remarks that in relation to 
U.K. commercial banking “we have lost the assurance of stability,” as 
the financial crisis demonstrated, yet still “experience fully the disad-
vantages of oligopoly.”35 U.S. Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, 
speaking at a congressional hearing on banking and antitrust in 2009, 
insisted similarly that “the named big banks or the entity big banks are a 
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 32. Id. at 12. 
 33. See Berle, supra note 11. 
 34. Id. at 592. 
 35. Kay, supra note 13. 
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monopoly.”36 Meanwhile, where investment banking more specifically is 
concerned, the ex-banker William D. Cohan is an articulate and forceful 
proponent of a similar argument. He believes that Wall Street was clearly 
a cartel in the mid-twentieth century, notwithstanding Judge Harold Me-
dina’s finding to the contrary in the Morgan case; and he says the busi-
ness “is an even more powerful and threatening cartel” today than it was 
then: 
Although banks will argue that all fees are negotiable, every corpo-
rate issuer knows the rules: Initial public offerings are priced at a 7 
percent fee; high-yield-debt underwriting is priced at 3 percent; loan 
syndications are priced at about 1 percent. M&A deals are still 
priced off the “Lehman formula,” even though there is no more 
Lehman Brothers.37 
C. Antitrust, Too Big to Fail, and the Political Economy of Competition 
In the context of our consideration of antitrust and TBTF banks, the 
significance of Berle’s thesis—and, alongside it, that of Baran and 
Sweezy—is simply as follows: Except where direct evidence of collusion 
or other manipulative practices is allegedly available as in the Carollo 
and Barclays cases (of course, these two cases, in any event, were not 
formally geared toward the TBTF issue), contemporary antitrust is in 
large measure rendered toothless if large corporations are not following 
economic laws because in the past half-century, antitrust theory and 
practice has been thoroughly economized. Put bluntly, an economic 
framework cannot help address a non-economic problem. 
I have already referred to one dimension of this economization of 
antitrust—the increasing focus in recent decades on efficiency princi-
ples—but it runs far deeper than that development alone. In 1984, Fred-
erick Rowe wrote powerfully of antitrust lapsing “into bondage to eco-
nomic models” from as early as the 1940s.38 The most important such 
model, before neoclassical efficiency concerns arrived on the scene, was 
the so-called Oligopoly Model, which posited that “few producers domi-
nating a concentrated market instinctively behaved like one monopolist,” 
                                                            
 36. ‘Too Big to Fail?’ Hearing, supra note 7, at 81–82 (statement of Sheila Jackson Lee, 
Member, Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy). She continued: “And you can point out to 
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 38. Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian 
Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1559 (1984). 
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and which, in relying on a concept of market power measurable by nu-
merical market shares, crucially “obviated proof of anti-competitive pur-
pose or effect.”39 Even Albert Foer now concedes that “[t]he course of 
antitrust has been determined by the Chicago School, where we focus on 
microeconomics, and in particular on short-term price effects . . . .”40 But 
perhaps the most striking acknowledgement of antitrust’s reduction to 
neoclassical economics can be found in the preface to the second, 2001 
edition of the textbook written by this tradition’s arguably most promi-
nent advocate and theorist, Richard Posner. “The first edition of this 
book [Antitrust Law], published a quarter of a century ago, bore the sub-
title ‘An Economic Perspective,’ implying there were other perspec-
tives. . . . In the intervening years, the other perspectives have largely 
fallen away”41—as, therefore, did the subtitle. 
We began with the question: Can antitrust law ordinarily help us in 
tackling the TBTF banking problem? I find myself in the unexpected 
position of agreeing with Lawrence White: No, it probably cannot. For 
me, however, this is not because TBTF is not an antitrust issue, but be-
cause I am personally persuaded by the arguments of Baran and Sweezy 
and Berle—that many large corporations, including (though not only) in 
banking, tend to avoid price competition at all costs; their rivalry, such as 
it is, is largely non-economic. To seriously confront the TBTF problem 
and the powers and risks it involves, therefore, antitrust would have to 
struggle free of the economistic straitjacket that currently confines and 
defines it. It would have to reintroduce some of the non-economic prin-
ciples—protection of small businesses, for example—that Posner ridi-
cules as political and ideological; as if neoclassical economics is itself 
ideology-free and politically neutral.42 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Competition, Confusion, and Commercial Banking, Almarin 
Philips observed, “The recent interest in competition in the commercial 
banking industry is a strange turn of events.”43 But this paper was pub-
lished not, as one might expect given the allusion to the “recent interest 
in competition,” in 2011 or 2012; rather, it was published in 1964. 
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As we have seen, the 1940s and 1950s were an exceptional period 
in the history of banking and competition policy insofar as competition, 
rather than stability, was prioritized. Philips regarded this turn to antitrust 
enforcement as strange precisely because it occurred against the back-
drop of a long history of pursuing stability. More pointedly, Phillips con-
jectured that antitrust investigations into banking were and would likely 
remain a case of “tilting at windmills” because “non-price forms of rival-
ry” were so embedded—sometimes covertly, but often overtly and legit-
imately.44 Given my own comparable diagnosis of the current conjunc-
ture, at a moment of similar heightening of interest in antitrust, I will 
leave the last word to Phillips in the form of this wonderfully wry and 
piercingly apt observation: “Fears of monopoly and of a substantial less-
ening of competition have arisen with regard to an industry which hither-
to few had regarded as competitive in the first place.”45 
                                                            
 44. Id. at 33, 40. 
 45. Id. at 32. 
